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Macedonia and Kosovo After the Military Operations 
 
By Antonina Zhelyazkova 
 
 
I. Approaches to the research and methodology 
 
The approach was interdisciplinary, i.e. a team of six scholars who applied specific methods and 
tools during the field work including a sociologist, a specialist in Slavonic studies, three 
anthropologists having individual tasks, a historian and a mediator-interpreter from Albania.1  
Objective: Within five days to make an interdisciplinary survey of the situation in Macedonia after 
the ceasing of the military operations, measured through the attitudes of the Kosovo refugees in 
and out of the camps, of the Macedonian Albanians and the Macedonians themselves. To analyze 
indirectly the political perspective in Kosovo, leaning on the concentration of potentially unlimited 
number of respondents from different towns and villages, representatives of different social groups 
in one place, i.e. through interviews, questionnaires, free conversations, video-interviews and 
observations. 
The questionnaires for the semi-standardized interviews, prepared by Prof. Peter-Emil Mitev, were 
filled in with 33 respondents in the Radusha and Bojane camps who came from more than 10 
settlements in Kosovo. When filling in the questionnaires a great number of campers gathered, this 
usually turning into a free conversation, comments, and discussions with the participation of 5 to 
15 persons. The respondents were men and women from 16 to 80 years of age. 
A lot of free interviews and talks were carried out with about 25-30 persons out of the camps who 
were refugees from Kosovo, Albanians from Macedonia, Albanians from Albania, Macedonians 
including politicians, members of the governing authorities in Macedonia, intellectuals, people 
with higher education and workers without any education.  
 
 II. Social specifications of the respondents 
 
1. Albanian refugees in the camps and in the private houses in Tetovo. 
 
The social picture in the camps is mixed, i.e. from illiterate people to students in the University of 
Prishtina and people with higher education. People with primary and secondary education are 
prevailing. One can hardly meet among the married women any with higher than primary 
education. Among the more elderly generation of women (from 50 to 60) one can often meet 
illiterate ones.  
It is a quite clear tendency for people from ordinary families to remain in the camps, people who do 
not belong to the formal or informal elite of the Kosovar Albanians. People who are apolitical or 
who feel strongly about the events and the future of Kosovo are prevailing, but they have never 
been at policy nor has their opinion ever been considered.  
The material status of the deported Kosovars does not play a significant role in the social hierarchy. 
One can meet in the camps people who identify themselves as very poor, i.e. without any income 
or with monthly income not over 50 DM, owing some land, as well as people who had their own 
business, hired workers, and monthly incomes of 2000 or 3000 DM at times. Almost all the 
families in the camps possess more or less land and they have (with the exceptions of some 
families) from 1 to 5 relatives “gastarbeiters”2 working in Western Europe, relying on them to a 
certain extent.  
                                                          
1 A.Angelov, G.Savov, V.Tepavicharov, D.Mihaylova, Kr. Stoilov, A.Zhelyazkova and A.Chaushi. 
2 Gastarbeiter – emigrant laborers, (Ger.) 
As soon as the camps were built, a system for supporting the refugees started working with funds 
sent by the relatives from Western Europe. Private agencies have been established which receive 
the money from Europe (very often ready cash), they trace down the relative-refugee or the refugee 
himself finds them and receives the consignment. There are some cases when the relative from 
Europe arrived in the camp to visit the representatives of their clan giving them net cash.  
One cannot see misery or low level of hygiene in the camps. People are neatly and tidily dressed, 
young people even look elegant. This is due rather to the internal organization of the Kosovars, the 
tradition to be clean and smart which is part of the family dignity than to the efforts of the 
humanitarian organizations. There are places, of course, where this order and hygiene are on a 
much higher level (e.g. the Radusha camp) because of the available running water.  
The detachment of representatives of the “fises"3 in order to get educated or to work abroad is part 
of the internal order, the age family organization and the rules in the fis as well as in the nuclear 
families that make up the fis. It is also by keeping to the traditional potestal4 model that the families 
detached a soldier or soldiers for UCK and paid the corresponding tax for support of the army.  
The family authority is determined by several markers that can be arranged in the following way 
according to their value: a) size of the family (number of the clan members), i.e. the clan authority 
depends to the greatest extent on the number of children and their upbringing. This basic marker 
for authority makes the nuclear families bring up more children. Women from the older generation 
(50-60 years of age) are proud to say that they have 10, 12 and even more children. One can feel, 
however, among the younger generation of women (18-30 years old), who already have 2 or 3 
children, strong resistance to give birth to more. Obviously, during the past 10-15 years, regardless 
of the pressure of the older men and women in the families, the birth rate has dropped down to 2-5 
children; b) affiliation to the several old historical North Albanian clans (e.g. Kelmendi, Hotti, 
Tachi, Krasnichi, Berisha, etc.);c) the moral and ethical authority of the family; and d) the quantity 
of land owned and its quality, number of houses and their outer appearance, furniture, livestock, 
etc.  
It should be mentioned here that the representatives of the old families as well as the intellectual 
elite of Kosovo, i.e. doctors, scholars, journalists, economists, sportsmen, etc., were carefully 
searched out by the Party of the Macedonian Albanians led by Arben Dzhafferi and transferred to 
Tetovo to be looked after in the homes of local Albanians. The widely spread version that the 
Macedonian Albanians received kinship families in their homes is untrue. A strict organizational 
system decided who and where to accommodate, how many and which refugees a family was to 
receive, done with one goal only – to preserve the elite of Kosovo. The respondents in Tetovo who 
had no refugees at their homes were a rarity and this obviously upset them and put them at a 
disadvantage. This can be probably explained with the lack of appropriate conditions but they 
assume it as shameful and humiliating. It is a question of prestige and hierarchical dignity to 
accommodate a definite number of elite refugees from Kosovo in the houses of the Albanians in 
Tetovo. According to the living conditions and opportunities as well as according to the internal 
hierarchy and confidence, scientists, journalists, etc. found lodgings sometimes in the houses of 
illiterate people or workers. To our question, “How do you feed 30 persons?”, we got strict and 
alike answers, “Once there is for us, there is also for them”.  
According to their religious affiliation all respondents in and out of the camps are Muslims, which 
did not give an answer to our question: By what internal organization and where were the Albanian 
Catholics or Orthodox directed to go, and how many of them were deported and prosecuted by the 
Serbian authorities?  
Religion is not among the first values in the moral system of the Kosovars. They admit the fact that 
they are Muslims without this being of particular significance for them. Adherence, known as early 
as the Middle Ages and the Ottoman period, has been preserved towards 1. the fis, the family, 2. 
                                                          
3 Fis, nature, (Gr), i.e. the big clan, relatives in the male line of descent. They all originate from one great-grandfather, 
observing the exogamy. Two lines of kinship are distinguished according to the traditions of the North Albanian 
mountaineers, i.e. on the father’s side “tree of the blood” and on the mother’s side – “tree of the milk” 
4 Potestal – power, authority (L. potestas) 
the territory, 3. the common ethnonym – shhkiptari (Albanians), and only ranking last – to some 
confessional group.  
The questions related to religion obviously aroused boredom in the respondents; they were 
considered obvious and unimportant, but they also did not feel very competent to speak in detail on 
this topic. Even the complex situation in the camps did not make them more religious – only a few 
men visited the mosques in the neighboring village only for the sake of change from the oppressive 
and monotonous life in the camp and to chat with the local people. An amazing religious 
indifference!  
One can perceive the same indifference when answering the question whether they expected help 
from the Muslim countries. They do not quite understand the question, they shrug their shoulders 
and most often say, “Yes, all will help us, Arabia too”, which is a sort of collective for the Muslim 
countries having no significant importance for them.  
It is important to mention the existence of a hierarchy in the potestal model in the fis itself, which 
is strictly dependent on sex and age. Men are at the top of the family hierarchy, with the oldest 
leading. The victims of the war in Kosovo have led to a breakdown in the families due to the loss 
of the head of the family, or the loss of the oldest son, brother, uncle, etc. Automatically, the family 
leadership is transferred to the oldest man that had survived. In some cases this could be even the 
father-in-law. Similarly the family has determined which one of the sons or the uncles would 
accompany the women, the children and the old people during their flight or deportation in order to 
take care of their survival.  
This “male” and “age” hierarchy is clearly outlined when building up the internal camp 
administration. Usually the public persons, i.e. the head of the refugee camp administration and his 
assistants are young men, even youths because they are educated and they know English and other 
Western languages. Likewise, because of their skills to communicate with the international 
humanitarian organizations and the guards from the Macedonian police, the young people from the 
camp administration are responsible for the order and the hygiene and try to find solution for the 
daily needs. In fact, however, young people do not make decisions because this right belongs to the 
older men, i.e. 50 – 70 years old. This is a sort of a Council of the elders who use the young people 
from the administration to be mediators and informers before they make their decisions.  
Regardless of these findings about the functioning of the Kosovar clan structure, some of the 
anthropologists, who spoke with the younger and the educated men and women, were persuaded 
that the fis organization was exhausted even in the 70s. The young people resist the strict hierarchy 
but, in fact, the modernization in this respect is hardly making the first steps: a) the clan is not 
living in a territorial community any more, families are spread all over the world, but still this does 
not decrease their internal commitments, relations and emotional ties; b) the small nuclear family is 
trying to impose its own model as regards education, choice of occupation, choice of matrimonial 
partner and number of children, but still it is obliged to keep to the tradition. The exhausting of the 
potestal clan model is rather a desire and aspiration of the young people than a real fact. 
 
2. Albanians in Macedonia and Albanians in Albania. Their social relations with the Kosovars 
 
The Albanians in Macedonia are definitely more conservative and less educated than the Kosovars 
and the Albanians from Albania. Along with this, according to the groups’ own evaluation, the 
Macedonian Albanians are richer than the Kosovars, who, on their part, are much richer than the 
population in Albania. The town of Tetovo makes an impression of a Muslim town from central or 
southeastern Anatolia. The restaurants and cafés are full of men only, and the women in the streets 
are covered with kerchiefs on their heads and ankle-length topcoats. When visiting their houses 
men sit down to table and women remain isolated in another room. It is not the custom for women 
to get higher education but only elementary or primary. The fashionably dressed women and those 
whom we met at the restaurants were refugees from Kosovo. They go out for a walk with their 
husbands and take the liberty of having a drink or a cigarette. They are smartly dressed and they 
feel embarrassed with the strict orders among the Albanians in Macedonia. For example, in the 
Bojane camp, supported by Turkey, which is in the close proximity of the village of Bojane, a strict 
Muslim atmosphere reigns, i.e. alcohol is nowhere to be bought, beer included.  
The Albanian intellectuals in Macedonia are euphorically eager to see the establishment of 
independent Kosovo where some of them could move to live and work. Many of them have 
graduated from the University of Prishtina, they worked there during the times of autonomy and 
they thought of Kosovo as the modern European center for all Albanians. Macedonia is not an 
alternative for the Kosovars because there exists a significant difference in the level of 
modernization, the level of religiousness (demonstrative and real), in the culture and mentality.  
Albania is not an alternative for the Kosovars either though they are closer as regards the level of 
erudition, of modernization and indifference towards religion. In fact, the Kosovars are much more 
open to the world and they are better acquainted with the European achievements. The Kosovars 
have a more pragmatic and constructive approach to the personal and social perspective while the 
real Albanians have passed through the deformation to build such senseless appurtenances as the 
pill-boxes and to maintain them after that for years regardless of their obvious inapplicability for 
whatever it might be. This, to a great degree, has destroyed the constructive feeling with the 
Albanians and has created an attitude to predestination as regards the chaos. The social 
differentiation and the crashing level of poverty in Albania divide and confront the Kosovars and 
the Albanians. In the years after the fall of the communist regime in Albania, the rich Kosovars 
came there with handsome sums to make business, to buy land and estates for nominal prices, to 
use hired labor for miserable remuneration both in legal and illegal transactions. All this haughty 
and offhand attitude of their rich brothers from Kosovo has hurt Albanian feelings. A respondent 
from Albania mentioned that if some refugees decided to stay in Albania, they would be hated and 
boycotted by the local population being insulted by their social superiority.  
The following attitude for the future of the three Albanian communities was outlined as a 
conclusion to the complex research analysis (the sociological inquiries included); the respondents 
are fully aware that they are one people, that part of the fisses have their own clans in the 
neighboring territories but they do not envisage a unification in a common state nor do they strive 
for that. It is maybe only on a political and ideological level where the idea for a united Great 
Albania is not strange, this referring mainly to the elite circles of Albania. The educated people 
from Kosovo and Macedonia rather count on facilitating the borders in the far future, and in the 
near future they hope for joint activities in independent Kosovo. It is definite that Kosovo is 
assumed as a future center of primary importance for all the Albanians in the world (I would call it 
the Mecca of the Albanians).  
 
3. The Macedonians 
 
The Macedonian respondents represent different social strata, i.e. governing bodies, politicians, 
scholars, intellectuals, hired workers, drivers, tradesmen. 
According to their present social characteristics the Macedonians resemble, to a certain extent, the 
Bulgarians, i.e. high level of unemployment, the prevailing part of the population is poor living on 
the edge of the social minimum, the intelligentsia is also poor without any self-confidence, there is 
no finesse among politicians. The political elite in Macedonia very much reminds one of the 
Bulgarian opposition politicians at the beginning of the democratic reforms in 1990-1991.  
The problems facing the state budget due to the refugees’ admittance is quite obvious. Ministries 
that are not of vital importance at the moment (e.g. the Ministries of Culture, Education, etc.) are 
functioning with a minimum budget and have practically stopped all activities, except for the most 
important ones. A respondent mentioned that some of these more peripheral ministries receive at 
the moment no more than 25-28% of their annual budget, hardly covering the staff salaries.  
The Macedonian respondents very often, though unwillingly, make a comparison of their social 
and economical status with the one of the local Albanians and the result is not in their favor. This 
can be seen, by the way, when comparing the two markets in Skopie: the Albanian old market and 
the public market of Skopie. The first one is clean and well arranged with many shops, boutiques, 
small restaurants and cafés. A kind of renaissance and cozy atmosphere is reigning there. The 
public market resembles a bazaar with Turkish goods. There is no atmosphere, no order, everything 
is chaotic. 
Obviously, the Albanians are richer, their inner solidarity and the support they receive from their 
relatives from Western Europe probably contributing to this. In the town of Tetovo, for example 
(about 78,000 people), consumption has doubled because of the necessity to feed and dress 
thousands of refugees. This, of course, has strengthened the Albanian businesses.  
One can feel the liveliness among the Albanians in Macedonia after the war in anticipation of 
starting an active business with independent Kosovo and the contrasting feeling of economic 
despondency that reigns among the Macedonians.  
The taxi-drivers guild who earn their living running the risk to drive foreign journalists, 
humanitarian officers and all other observers to and from Kosovo, considers that this is their 
chance to accumulate money for their families before the deep economic crisis that is to follow the 
foreigners' departure. Some of them mentioned, by the way, that they would try to reorient their 
business to transporting fuel to Kosovo, which also gives promise for good profits. In a word, there 
is a sort of striving towards some kind of economic survival among the Macedonians through trade 
or semi-legal business in the post-war situation but this concerns a small strata of the population.  
One gets the impression that there are a lot of families where only one of the work-able family 
members has a permanent job; this should not be taken as the rule given in the small sample.  
A Macedonian woman coming from a native Skopie family, after complaining that only she had a 
permanent job as her husband was unemployed, her daughter, too and her son worked from time to 
time taking whatever comes, concluded, “The Albanians in Macedonia are doing well, they earn 
much more than us. So it is quite normal that I am afraid that the refugees could remain here, and 
let them not increase in number”. The same woman told us that she was living next to houses 
inhabited by Albanian families. To our question how they were living and whether their way of life 
strongly differed, she answered shrugging her shoulders, “I do not know, they are reticent people, 
we, too. We do not communicate, I do not know how they live but I know that they are rich”.  
 
III. Psychological portraits of different ethnic and social levels 
 
1. Albanian refugees in the camps and in the houses of Tetovo 
 
The period from 16th to 20th June set as a premise a comparatively calm and balanced emotional 
state of the respondents in the camps. Conditions in the camps are good and there is no tension 
caused by daily discomfort.  
The Kosovars are filled with emotional enthusiasm and gratitude towards the USA, for their 
support of independent Kosovo. That is why it was a surprise when, in the subsequent answers, 
they pointed out Deutsche Welle as the radio they listened to most of all and trusted most of all. 
The broadcasts of Deutsche Welle in Albanian language have a significant advantage over BBC, 
Free Europe and the Voice of America, even over the broadcasts of Radio Tirana and the Albanian 
transmissions of the Macedonian Radio. Several persons mentioned that they listened to the 
transmissions in Albanian language of Radio Bulgaria. Judging by the Bulgarian transmissions of 
Deutsche Welle during the war, it is obvious that this radio station is offering more varied points of 
view, their comments are easier of access for listeners with differences in their views. Just as a 
parallel, I’d like to remind that before the fall of Zhivkov’s regime, Deutsche Welle was the radio 
the Turks and the Muslims in Bulgaria listened to.  
The respondents’ ideas about Western Europe and the USA are different. Most of them know 
Europe well through their own experience or the stories of relatives and they have quite a realistic 
idea how far they could rely on aid and support from the European countries. Their ideas about the 
USA are nonrealistic as well as their expectations for a “horn of plenty” that will pour into the 
freedom-loving and independent Kosovo. To our questions “Why do you leave these clothes in the 
camps?”, they answered, “When we reach home the Americans will give us more!”; “Will the 
Europeans help for the restoration of Kosovo?”, - “A little, maybe, Albright said they should help 
as well!”  
Regardless of all they have suffered, the optimistic spirits are prevailing gradually turning into 
euphoria. The tenacious desire for an urgent return to their homes and to participate in the 
restoration of Kosovo has been motivated by the idea that this is the only (for decades past) chance 
for the Kosovars to obtain their independent state and to build their life keeping to their own 
understandings. Their readiness to participate in the rebuilding of a free Kosovo eliminates the 
traditional attitude of quick personal prosperity via emigrating to some West European country. 
The respondents maintain that even part of the refugees who were transferred to the West 
according to special lists as well as part of those Kosovars who have been working for years in the 
European countries, will come back to take part in the rapid restoration of Kosovo.  
Part of the expectations are not realistic, especially as regards the rates of the political stabilization 
of the region, i.e. quick holding of elections, understanding among the leaders, civil management of 
full value, magic opportunities of the western protectorate, etc., as well as the restoration of the 
family material losses (e.g. ruined houses, ruined business, crop failure, lost livestock, etc.).  
We include in the unreal self-evaluations and expectations the obvious myth about “Kosovo as the 
richest land in the Balkans” and therefore so dispute and longed for by all. The respondents, mainly 
the better educated, are inclined to speak on this topic starting from the rich agricultural produce, 
the factories and the plants, the Kosovars as the most industrious people in the Balkans, going so 
far as to the exaggerated mineral resources, i.e. diamond and gold mines, ores, rare metals, etc. By 
the way, at the beginning of the war, Bulgarian respondents with "shadowy business" connections 
animatedly discussed the reasons for the USA's interference, i.e. the diamond and gold mines in 
Kosovo, the eldorado of the Balkans.  
In spite of the extreme circumstances, the collective ideas of the Kosovar Albanians for power, 
self-management and authority have not changed which makes them believe that the Albanian 
leaders will have to obey the elders of the clan and to try to achieve understanding among them. 
The comments about the new leaders of UCK were accepted with assent but with the remark that, 
if necessary, the young leaders would stand to attention before the elders of their families.  
The prevailing part of the respondents chooses the ideal variant as regards the Kosovo leaders: to 
come to an agreement, not to split, and to solve the fate of Kosovo together. To our persistent 
question “who would they choose if the leaders did not get along together”, most of them pointed 
out Rugova without any hesitation. They believe that he had been forced to negotiate with 
Milosevic, they like the fact that he is moderate and has always endeavoured to avoid victims. On 
the basis of this prevailing assessment, however, one cannot make political prognosis as it is 
obvious that the opinion of the Kosovars will be talked over, manipulated, etc. after they return to 
their native places. This was stated in outspoken terms and with irritation by one of the political 
leaders of the Albanians in Macedonia: “Now they do not know the truth. When they go back to 
Kosovo they will find out who is the real leader and who is the traitor.”  
It was a surprising discovery to perceive among the Kosovars a deeply hidden yugo-nostalgia. The 
old and middle aged men underlined during our long talks the positive aspects while living in 
Yugoslavia, especially at the time of autonomy. It was a significant memory for those who studied 
or worked in ethnically mixed environment, and Serbs, Albanians, Bosnians, Croatians, etc. 
gathered in one place, studied and worked together making no difference of their ethnic or religious 
origin. The calm life, the opportunities to work in Europe and the accumulation of personal wealth, 
all this was narrated with nostalgia.  
The feud with the Serbs is deep and will be long lasting. All respondents declared emotionally but 
categorically that they could not live with the Serbs, but they added “for the time being”. The 
desire for revenge and vengeance can be easily perceived among the refugees, and especially 
among those who have lost members of their families or among the youth between 16 and 20 years 
of age. In general, the radicalism of the youngest boys was obvious. Even some young women 
uttered threats for revenge. The attempts to remind for the good-neighbor co-existence from 
previous years met the habitual stereotype: “My neighbors Jovan and Militsa are good people but 
the Serbs are bad”, or “They did a lot of evil to reconcile on the basis of our childhood memories.”  
Among the elder Kosovars with higher education, even if they suffered heavy losses, the answer 
was: “Right now it is not possible to live together, but in several years the business contacts will be 
restored and the relations will gradually normalize. The economic logic will call for this”. The 
basic bearers of attitudes of intolerance are the youngest people as well as the illiterate people but 
this is not related with the burden of the suffered losses because the educated people as well as the 
older ones admitted that now or later, life would have its own way and they would communicate 
with the Serbs. This is a perspective for resignation and not for reconciliation.  
The rupture with the Romas, who even in the beginning of 1998 had been used by the Serbian 
police and army to plunder and maraud in the Albanian estates, is dramatic. With unleashing the 
war, according to the statements of the respondents, they committed much heavier crimes, i.e. 
treacheries. It is quite inadmissible and unforgivable for the Kosovars that the Romas buried the 
victims in mass graves, thus desecrating the bodies without observing the most needed rituals.  
Kosovars are intolerant towards the Turks as well. They explain this with the fact that the Turks 
collaborated with the Serbian authorities. In fact, the Albanians feel a sort of ethnic superiority as 
regards the Turks (the same attitude was registered among the Albanians in Macedonia). They 
consider them people of lower quality, and they even are inclined to think that these are not Turks 
in fact but Albanians converted to Mohammedanism (a thesis that is not new for the Balkans in 
various versions).  
In the course of our research we did not face any case with a raped woman, nor did we hear similar 
stories though we spoke about the most intimate things with women of different ages. There was 
even a Women’s committee in the Radusha camp, which facilitated the life of the women and 
organized them for different activities but they did not mention this as a problem either. The 
anthropologists, on their side, who worked with the men, after strengthening their confidence and 
the friendly relations, were also informed about some intimate issues and their advice was sought 
but no cases of raped women were mentioned. We were left with the impression that if there were 
such cases in the course of the war, they were isolated and not a mass practice. Our team did not 
feel any tension on this topic although we were told dramatic stories of losses, violence and 
humiliations.  
The conclusion is that the Kosovars are in a highly excited, euphoric state which is very easy to 
manipulate. Very often, in the course of our discussions, the respondents wept for anger, sorrow or 
gratitude. The fact that they were not in a position to observe some of their obligatory traditions 
and rituals, as the rituals of hospitality, for example, plunged them into despair. An old man wept 
when I had to leave the tent after one-hour talk without his having treated me. He shouted to his 
sons, “Bring a glass of cold water at least”. Then we made a settlement by compromise that he had 
been my guest, so I took a box with sweeties, and promised to be his guest at his home in Prishtina.  
It is entirely in the hands of the leaders where to direct this piled up super- emotionality and energy 
for freedom and independence, for prosperity in the future. It can very easily be plunged in a 
constructive direction but it could also be directed towards revenge, political polarization and 
vandalism. 
The attitude towards Bulgaria and the Bulgarians is positive; one can feel the strong respect as 
regards the democratic achievements. It has been evaluated quite precisely that the Bulgarians are 
poor, they express their sympathy, but according to their value system this is not the most 
important thing. Bulgarians are evaluated as the most reasonable and democratic people in the 
Balkans. Well known are the facts for a good ethnic understanding in Bulgaria. There is no offence 
as regards the fact that we did not accept refugees because this is considered the right decision by 
the Bulgarians (it was right for both the Kosovar refugees and for Bulgaria). The medical teams 
and the Bulgarian military men who had achieved good living conditions in the Radusha camp and 
inspired a sense of security, (there were 30 pregnant women who expected their birth terms; some 
of them had not been examined by a gynaecologist for the last 4-5 months, and others - never 
before), built up the good image of Bulgaria and the desire for trade and cooperation in the future. 
The fact that we fulfilled each of our promise given the previous day, was met with satisfaction 
because their original positive attitude towards the Bulgarians was confirmed and this spread 
immediately through the entire camp. The team set the start of many friendships, some of them 
holding future perspectives.  
It was surprising that the Kosovars did not express a sense of gratitude towards the Macedonians 
who gave them shelter and took care of them. They answered unwillingly to the questions referring 
to their attitude towards the Macedonians. Stress, offence and negative feelings had piled up in 
them from what they suffered in Blatse. Even those, who had not crossed this point as deportees, 
knew in details about the sufferings of their compatriots and they nursed bad feelings. Only a few 
young respondents (about 18 years old) said in an offhand manner, “Macedonians are not good 
people”, but catching them with the question whether they would trade with Macedonia, the 
respondents answered affirmatively (with some exceptions only), “We have traded with Macedonia 
and we shall trade in the future”.  
The Albanians from Macedonia are not willing to give an opinion about the Macedonians: “We 
live together normally. But you can see, our politicians reached an agreement. Now everything is 
OK”.  
 
2. Macedonians and Macedonian society as a whole 
 
Macedonians are in a depressed state regardless of their educational and social status level. They 
are seized with the feeling of hopelessness and fear in two directions thus feeling themselves as if 
pressed in a vice. On the one hand, they are already in an economic crisis and are quite well aware 
of the perspective of a much deeper economic and social depression with all its shocks, i.e. 
unemployment, worsened health services, decline in the level of education and culture, growing 
criminality, strengthening of the mafiotic structures and corruption, fall of standard to unknown 
low levels, etc. On the other hand, they feel themselves threatened ethnically, nationally and 
civilizationally in some hypertrophic and unreal dimensions. They are afraid of the Albanian 
demographic expansion in the Balkans and their expectations are that in a few years they will be 
half of the Macedonian population with the tendency to be more and more ousted. The language 
when talking about the Albanians, is diversified with military terms: “Bitolja fell”, Tetovo is 
Albanian”, Struga is conquered”, “Ohrid is still keeping its ground”, etc. Fear lies at the root of the 
myths for the adoption of the Kosovars in Macedonia, for buying houses, lands and their gradual 
settling as well as the unjustified fear that a great part of the refugees will remain in Macedonia.  
The respondents reacted aggressively to our questions putting counter-questions: “Have you ever 
seen a Muslim with less than 5-8 children? And what about you, how many children have you got 
or have you any children at all?”; “How many Muslims are there in Bulgaria?”, “They will soon 
sweep over you as well”, “Do you have Albanians in your country?”, “Oh, the Turks are something 
else, one can live with them….”; “What shall we do?” – “All the orthodox people in the Balkans 
should unite in one state in order to withstand the Albanians and the Muslims…”, “It is maybe only 
a confederation with Bulgaria that could frighten these shipters…” Why did you give air passages 
to NATO but not to Russia?”, “Macedonia will be small for them, they’ll come to Bulgaria too”. 
This fear, verging on neurosis explains the fact that not one Macedonian family invited refugees at 
their home and the refugees caused a new escalation of the xenophobic feelings among the 
Macedonians.  
It is surprising that they have lost the will to find the exit from this fear. The feeling of 
predestination separates the two big ethnic groups more and more. The Macedonians think that the 
Albanians are conservative, reticent, not admitting any external people, they consider themselves as 
self-sufficient and for this reason even scholars are not actively studying them. It is preliminary 
assumed that the close contact of ethnographers, anthropologists and sociologists will not lead to 
scientifically based results because even if the Albanians accept the interviewers, they will lie to 
them giving information imposed from on top. This proved to be absolutely false – the Albanians 
are open to contacts and they are willing to narrate about themselves, the traditions, the habits, the 
families, the prospects, their political views, etc.  
 
Conclusion 
 
1. Albanians and Macedonians are ethno-capsulated to each other, they do not know each other and 
in some cases this verges on ignorance. It is obvious that the level of negative stereotypes is very 
high and even if this fact is concealed, quite notable is the fear of Macedonians from demographic 
and cultural invasion as well as the fear of the possibility of a gradual national erasing of the 
Macedonian identity.  
The Albanians, on their side, are convinced of their future as an ethnos but they are filled with 
suspicion and haughtiness towards the Macedonians. At this stage they cannot forgive them for the 
years when they were citizens of low standing and they were not admitted to the Macedonian 
institutions and the all-Macedonian elite. An Albanian political leader described the Albanian 
community at the present moment in the following way: “We are like an empty house which had 
the barest necessities so far, i.e. a bed, a chair and a table. Everything is important for us, 
everything is necessary in order to upholster in the proper manner, like all the others”. The 
respondents among the Albanian politicians and intellectuals in all cases formulated their ethnic 
interests by linking the democratization and europeanization of Macedonia rather with the 
institutionalization of the Albanian interests and their legitimization through the laws and the 
constitution than with integration.  
The interethnic situation is different from the one in Bulgaria, not because of the different 
demographic indices but because of the entirely reversed structure. The political elite in Bulgaria as 
well as the different governments were never willing to work with and for the minorities, to solve 
their problems, to work for their integration, etc. Usually, the ethnic confrontation and tension is 
between the political class and the society in its approximate entity including the minorities and the 
majority. Particularly in the regions with mixed population, there exists a normal co-existence on a 
wide social level as well as very good cognoscibility and sociability of the ethnic and religious 
groups with each other. The attempts of politicians to rouse nationalistic sentiments and to oppose 
the ethnic communities gave no results for the past ten years due to the functioning of a civil 
society and democratic rules in the political life. Still, one can say that it is the society that stops the 
attempts to set the ethnic communities against each other and to break the traditional good-
neighborhood model.  
In Macedonia it is vice versa (the situation analysis refers to this moment): There is a coalition and 
integration in authority on the level of political élites and governing authorities, the TV transmits 
special programs for the Albanians and the Romas, newspapers for the minorities are published, 
etc. There exists a sort of obvious, demonstrative political integration and cooperation among the 
ethnic communities on the high level but there is no equilibrium, balance and worked out 
mechanisms of mutual co-existence with confidence and respect for the traditions and customs of 
“the others” in all the social layers under the political elité. There was not such alienation in 
Bulgaria even during the years of the so-called “regenerative process”. This should be checked 
once again via comprehensive field work in Macedonia but one gets the impression that the 
governing authorities are trying to impose the tolerance “from high quarters”, to repress but not to 
settle the interethnic tensions. The Bulgarian experience showed that sometimes such a forced 
approach may work (see the resolutions imposed by the governing authorities for the ratification of 
the Framework Convention, as well as for the acknowledgement of the Macedonian language), but 
only after spending some years in solving the problems “from below” and carrying out a wide 
public discussion on the topics.  
2. The impressive cross-purposes in the emotional and psychological attitudes of the two big ethnic 
communities that constitute the Macedonian society, i.e. Macedonians and Albanians, are 
dangerous for the civil peace in Macedonia. The first ones are pessimistic and deprived of faith 
leading to depression as they do not see any close perspective for a normal development and still 
less do they see any prospects for their family prosperity and the Macedonian nation as a whole. 
The second are in the apogee of their optimism for the future and they are filled with enthusiasm 
and conviction in their abilities, tested and confirmed in the crucial situation caused by the 
refugee's flow. This psychological disbalance could be gradually calmed down through the 
establishment of strong civil and non-governmental structures that will try to find a way of 
decreasing the tension, of opening and rapprochement of both communities as well as through the 
building up of a common and constructive prospect for the Macedonian state. Bulgaria is interested 
in supporting the development of the civil sector in the Republic of Macedonia as well as to 
encourage the Bulgarian non-governmental organizations to develop joint projects in the field of 
the interethnic understanding and all-Balkan cooperation.  
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